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ABSTRACT
The transportation system is rapidly evolving with new connected and automated
vehicle (CAV) technologies that integrate CAVs with other vehicles and roadside
infrastructure to form a transportation cyber-physical system (TCPS). Through
connectivity, CAVs affect their environments and vice versa, increasing the size of the
cyberattack surface and the risk of exploitation of security vulnerabilities by malicious
actors. Thus, a greater understanding of potential CAV-TCPS cyber-attacks and of ways
to prevent them is a high priority. Moreover, making the CAV navigate safely in an
unexpected environment is a critical safety requirement. Considering the safety while
maintaining the in-vehicle security is the focus of this study, where first, in part 1, the
author explores the CAV safety through machine learning models, more specifically deep
neural network, to help the vehicle to navigate safely in an unexpected environment, which
is required for real-world deployment and has not been fully explored by researchers and
industries. In part 2, the author developed a connected vehicle application development
platform (CVDeP), such that developers can develop and validate the CAV safety and
mobility applications in a controlled and real-world connected vehicle testbed. Our study
shows that applications developed through the platform meet the safety requirements of
connected vehicle applications.
Later, in part 3, the author explores the in-vehicle security aspect, where the author
leverages the state-of-the-art cloud supported quantum computers to classify in-vehicle
cyberattacks, more specifically amplitude shift attacks. The author develop the quantumclassical hybrid neural network to detect amplitude shift in-vehicle cyberattack. This study
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integrates the digital infrastructure and a CAV’s in-vehicle system, where the author has
shown the potential of using a combination of quantum and classical neural network to
improve the cyberattack detection accuracy compared to classical neural network and
quantum neural network alone.
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CHAPTER ONE
VISION-BASED NAVIGATION OF AUTONOMOUS VEHICLES IN ROADWAY
ENVIRONMENTS WITH UNEXPECTED HAZARDS

Introduction
Vision-based navigation of autonomous vehicles primarily depends on the Deep
Neural Network (DNN) based systems in which the controller obtains input from
sensors/detectors, such as cameras and produces a vehicle control output, such as a steering
wheel angle to navigate the vehicle safely in a roadway traffic environment. Typically,
these DNN-based systems of the autonomous vehicle are trained through supervised
learning; however, recent studies show that a trained DNN-based system can be
compromised by perturbation or adversarial inputs. Similarly, this perturbation can be
introduced into the DNN-based systems of autonomous vehicles by unexpected roadway
hazards, such as debris and roadblocks. In this study, the author first introduces a roadway
hazardous environment (both intentional and unintentional roadway hazards) that can
compromise the DNN-based navigational system of an autonomous vehicle, and produces
an incorrect steering wheel angle, which can cause crashes resulting in fatality and injury.
Then, the author develops a DNN-based autonomous vehicle driving system using object
detection and semantic segmentation to mitigate the adverse effect of this type of hazardous
environment, which helps the autonomous vehicle to navigate safely around such hazards.
The author find that our developed DNN-based autonomous vehicle driving system
including hazardous object detection and semantic segmentation improves the navigational
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ability of an autonomous vehicle to avoid a potential hazard by 21% compared to the
traditional DNN-based autonomous vehicle driving system (Islam et al. 2019).
According to the 2016 American automobile association report, 50,658 crashes
occurred in the U.S. from the year 2011 to 2014 due to debris resulting in 9,805 injuries
and 125 deaths annually (Tefft 2016). The roadway hazards, such as debris, are considered
to be non-fixed and unexpected objects on the travel or driving lane of the roadway and
include objects that have fallen from vehicles or have come from construction sites or
littering. Given that the autonomous vehicle is considered the future of surface
transportation, its ability to detect debris or hazards and then navigate safely around them
is crucial for avoiding potential crashes. Recently, such a navigational task has been
accomplished using Deep Neural Network (DNN). Typically, an autonomous vehicle
perceives its surrounding roadway environment using sensors, and the software running in
the vehicle determines the action to be taken based on the input from the sensors. Several
types of sensors, such as vision-based sensors (e.g., Cameras), LIDAR, and Radar are
currently available for the perception task. Due to the cost-effectiveness of the vision-based
sensor compared to the other types of sensors (e.g., LIDAR and Radar), vision-based
navigation becomes an attractive solution for autonomous vehicles (Bertozzi, Broggi, and
Fascioli 2000)(Dagan et al. 2004)(Tatarek, Kronenberger, and Handmann 2017).
The recent development of DNNs, in particular, Convolutional Neural Network
(CNN)(Krizhevsky, Sutskever, and Hinton 2012), has improved vision-based navigation
for autonomous vehicles significantly. After being trained and tested using a dataset
collected by sensors, these CNN models are then deployed in autonomous vehicles to
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navigate the vehicle safely. For example, during training, the CNN-based end-to-end
driving model maps a relationship between the driving behavior of humans using roadway
images collected from cameras and the steering wheel angle (Yang et al. 2018)(Bojarski et
al. 2016). Thus, the performance of autonomous vehicles primarily depends on the training
dataset, meaning if a hazard that the CNN model is not trained on appears on the roadway,
the autonomous vehicle driving model may produce an incorrect steering wheel angle and
may cause a crash. A recent study shows that the autonomous vehicle navigation system
may fail to navigate safely due to several reasons, such as Radar sensor failure, camera
sensor failure, and software failure (Bhavsar et al. 2017). This study addresses the situation
where a well-trained driving model may fail due to unexpected hazards that may lead to
unsafe navigation, and then explores the use of object detection and semantic segmentation
(Yao, Fidler, and Urtasun 2012) for mitigating the navigational problem in this hazardous
condition.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. The related work section
explores the existing studies on autonomous vehicle navigation, state-of-art DNN-based
autonomous vehicle driving models, and the limitations of the traditional DNN-based
model. Then the author introduces the method developed in this study for navigating an
autonomous vehicle on a roadway with unexpected hazards. Furthermore, the author
validate our proposed method using three case studies: (i) a model trained using a dataset
that includes hazards but without considering them as separate input features; (ii) a model
trained on a dataset that considers hazards as separate input features and uses a distance
measurement sensor and image segmentation; (iii) a model trained on a dataset that
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considers hazards as separate input features and only uses image segmentation. In the
second and third case studies, the author introduces a DNN-based autonomous vehicle
driving system to enhance the ability of an autonomous vehicle to navigate safely in a
hazardous environment. Then the author presents the experimental setup employed in this
study. After that, the author evaluates all the case scenarios and report the results obtained
through our experiments, and finally, the author discusses the conclusions and suggest the
areas for future work.

Related work
This section reviews the previous research on hazard detection, the DNN-based
driving systems used in an autonomous vehicle, and the techniques for and the importance
of object detection and image segmentation in addition to the limitations of using DNN in
autonomous vehicles.
DNN-based Autonomous Vehicle Driving Model
DNN-based autonomous vehicle driving systems are rapidly evolving (Bojarski et
al. 2016)(Pomerleau 1989). Not only software companies such as Waymo (Google) Uber,
and Lyft are using the DNN-based systems for autonomous vehicles, but many car
companies such as Tesla, Volvo, BMW, and Ford are currently working on DNN-based
autonomous vehicles driving systems (Zhang et al. 2018). In such systems, sensors like
cameras, LIDAR, and Radar provide input to DNN models, such as Convolutional Neural
Network (CNN)(Krizhevsky, Sutskever, and Hinton 2012) or Recurrent Neural Network
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(RNN) (Mnih et al. 2015), which then produce outputs such as steering wheel angle and
velocity. For example, the autonomous vehicle architecture developed by NVIDIA, named
DAVE-2, uses a CNN model which takes input from a camera and outputs a steering wheel
commands for navigation (Bojarski et al. 2016), while Udacity autonomous vehicle driving
architectures include both CNN-based (e.g., Autumn) and RNN-based (e.g., Chauffeur
using CNN and RNN) (“Udacity Self Driving Car,” n.d.). This study used a CNN-based
driving model similar to DAVE-2 as it is the fundamental base of DNN-based autonomous
vehicle systems.
DNN-based autonomous vehicle driving systems, which are intrinsically software
systems, can be error-prone and cause severe consequences if they do not function as
intended. Several studies have shown the vulnerabilities of the existing DNN models
(Carlini and Wagner 2017)(Papernot, McDaniel, et al. 2016)(Athalye, Carlini, and Wagner
2018)(Papernot, Mcdaniel, et al. 2016). For example, DNN-based image classification can
be exploited by adding a small perturbation to an input image such that the DNN model
misclassifies it as another category, a vulnerability recently confirmed by (Eykholt et al.
2017), which found that attackers can physically modify objects using a low-cost technique
to cause classification errors in DNN-based vision systems. These perturbations can be
introduced under widely varying distances, angles, and resolutions. For example, in
(Eykholt et al. 2017) perturbations caused a DNN model to interpret a subtly modified
physical stop sign as a speed limit of 45 mph sign. Similarly, the debris or roadblocks on
the road can also compromise the autonomous vehicle driving system by producing
incorrect steering wheel angles, potentially causing a fatal collision. These limitations
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prompted this study to evaluate the impact of unexpected hazardous environments on a
DNN-based autonomous vehicle driving system.
Autonomous Vehicle Dataset
Data are an important part of deep learning-based systems, and this study requires
a dataset that supports (i) end-to-end driving systems (input: image; output: steering wheel
angle), (ii) image segmentation, and (iii) hazard detection. To find an appropriate one, the
author explores various existing datasets used by the autonomous vehicle community. The
closest dataset is provided by Udacity, which supports end-to-end data and image
segmentation, but it does not provide the ground truth for hazards in the drivable lane
(“Udacity Self Driving Car,” n.d.). KTTI (Geiger et al. 2013) and Cityscape (Cordts et al.
2016) datasets also do not support hazard detection as ground truth data. The dataset
matching our requirements the closest is the Lost and Found dataset (Pinggera et al. 2016),
which contains the image as the input, and the yaw rate (angular velocity), but not the
steering wheel angle required by this study, as an output. Since existing datasets do not
fully meet our needs, after careful consideration, the author created our dataset using
simulation as described in the experimental setup section.
DNN-based Object Detection and Segmentation
Object detection and classification are core components of autonomous driving. By
detecting and classifying the objects, the autonomous vehicle controller determines safe
navigation for both path planning and route planning. If an autonomous vehicle is not able
to detect unexpected hazards on the road, it will not be able to navigate safely, perhaps
resulting in a crash. However, detecting these objects or hazards is a challenging task.
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While various sensors, such as Radar and LIDAR, can be used for accurate distance and
velocity measurement, these sensors are relatively costly than camera sensors (Pinggera et
al. 2016). Considering these limitations, vision-based sensors, such as cameras, are being
used on autonomous vehicles for the navigational task. With the recent development of
DNNs, DNN-based object detection and semantic segmentation can be applied to detect
these roadway hazards, making navigation of autonomous vehicles safer.
Semantic segmentation is a technology that has been widely used in the computer
vision area to divide an unknown image into different parts (Guo et al. 2018), can be
applied to an image containing unknown objects. This technology is effective in providing
the scenario depicted by an image, allowing the DNN to capture additional information
about the dataset during training. There are three major types of semantic segmentation
technologies: Region-based semantic segmentation (Caesar, Uijlings, and Ferrari
2016)(Girshick et al. 2014), Fully Convolutional Network (FCN)-based semantic
segmentation (Long, Shelhamer, and Darrell 2015)(Eigen and Fergus 2015)(Liu, Guo, and
Lew 2017) and Weakly-Supervised semantic segmentation (Dai, He, and Sun
2015)(Papandreou et al. 2015)(Khoreva et al. 2017). The region-based semantic
segmentation provides segmentation based on the results of object detection, meaning it
can be developed on any CNN model. The FCN-based semantic segmentation segments
each pixel of the image, meaning it does not require extracting regions of the image and,
thus, can be applied to arbitrary sizes of images. The weakly supervised semantic
segmentation technology, which was developed to reduce the labeling cost of a large
dataset (Khoreva et al. 2017), achieves semantic segmentation by exploiting annotated
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bounding boxes or image-level labels. While recent studies show that segmentation-based
navigation can improve navigational performance (Eraqi, Moustafa, and Honer
2017)(Teichmann et al. 2016)(Siam et al. 2018), none considers the navigation of
autonomous vehicles in hazardous environments. Thus, by leveraging these DNN-based
models, the author can detect hazards and then extract their semantic information from
images obtained from the camera sensor of an autonomous vehicle. The approach adopted
in this study uses an FCN-based model as one such network is relatively small, yet the
network yields fast results (Long, Shelhamer, and Darrell 2015). To the best of our
knowledge, this is the first work that develops a DNN-based autonomous vehicle driving
system focusing on unexpected roadway hazardous environments.

Method
In this section, the author describe our approach for developing a safer autonomous
vehicle driving system in a hazardous environment. This study uses DNN-based object
detection and segmentation to create a corrected image, which is subsequently used by the
autonomous vehicle driving system to predict the steering wheel angle. As presented in
Figure 1. 1, the author develops a DNN-based autonomous vehicle driving system, which
comprises three DNN models. The first one is the DNN-based hazard detection and
segmentation model, which detects the hazard and creates a segmented image. The second
model is the hazard analysis and avoidance model, which fuses the segmented image with
the original input image from the dashboard camera to make the autonomous vehicle
driving model aware of the unexpected roadway hazards. This model then analyzes the
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hazard and determines if the hazard should be ignored or considered as a threat for a
potential crash using a threat factor (𝑇𝑓 ). The third model is the DNN-based autonomous
vehicle driving model, which takes the fused image with hazard information and produces
the steering wheel angle required to navigate the vehicle safely in an unexpected hazardous
environment. The author provided a detailed description of these three models in the
following subsections.

Figure 1. 1 DNN-based autonomous vehicle driving system in an unexpected
hazardous environment (Islam et al. 2019).
DNN-based hazard detection and segmentation model
For hazard detection and image segmentation, this study uses an FCN, which is a
DNN-based image object detection and segmentation model (Long, Shelhamer, and Darrell
2015). Figure 1. 2 shows the structure of the FCN network used in our study. It takes an
input of image size 400x600x3 and outputs a segmented image of the same size. The author
uses a pre-trained network with a weight of VGGNet (Simonyan and Zisserman 2014),
which is a deep convolutional network for large-scale image recognition, and then the
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author re-trained the model with our training dataset to classify the hazard and perform
image segmentation.

Figure 1. 2 FCN-based object detection and image segmentation model used in this
study (Islam et al. 2019).
Hazard analysis and avoidance model
As shown in Figure 1. 1, the image captured from the center dashboard camera first
goes to the hazard detection and segmentation model, which provides an output of the
detected object in addition to a segmented image. Then, this output is combined with the
original image in the hazard analysis and avoidance model. In this study, the author
developed a hazard analysis and avoidance model based on the following equation:
𝐼 = (1 − 𝑇𝑓 ) × 𝐼𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙 + 𝑇𝑓 × 𝐼𝑠𝑒𝑔𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑑
where 𝐼 is the image used to predict the autonomous vehicle driving model;
𝐼𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙 is the data from the center dashboard camera of the vehicle; 𝐼𝑠𝑒𝑔𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑑 is the
segmented image of 𝐼𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙 containing the hazardous object detected and segmented;
and 𝑇𝑓 is the threat value of the detected hazardous object or physical-world threat object.
This threat value depends on the position of a detected object on a driving lane. If the object
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is dangerous to the autonomous vehicle, it will have a high threat factor, while a negligible
threat object will have a lower threat factor. This threat value depends on the longitudinal
and latitudinal distance from the autonomous vehicle. Depending on the hazardous object
localization technique, the author has used two procedures to determine the threat value:
(ii) Procedure 1 - threat value determination using a distance measurement sensor (e.g.,
Radar); and (ii) Procedure 2 – threat value determination using image segmentation.
Procedure 1 - threat value determination using a distance measurement sensor
According to the first procedure, the author measures the longitudinal distance (𝑙𝑥 ),
and latitudinal distance (𝑙𝑦 ) of hazardous objects from the vehicle using a distance
measurement sensor. If the vehicle is moving forward (longitudinal movement) or steering
towards (latitudinal movement) the hazard the value of 𝑙𝑥 and 𝑙𝑦 decreases, respectively,
and hence the hazard poses a higher threat of colliding with the vehicle. The author
considers the hazard as a threat to the vehicle if the hazard is within the longitudinal
distance, 𝑙𝑥,𝑚𝑎𝑥 and latitudinal distance, 𝑙𝑦,𝑚𝑎𝑥 . In our study, the author uses the Radar
sensor to measure the longitudinal distance and the latitudinal distance, and the author
measures the threat value using the following equations:

2

2

𝑙𝑦,𝑚𝑎𝑥 − 𝑙𝑦
𝑙𝑥,𝑚𝑎𝑥 − 𝑙𝑥
𝑇 = √(
) +(
)
𝑙𝑥,𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝑙𝑦,𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝑇 − 𝑇𝑚𝑖𝑛
𝑇𝑓 = {𝑇𝑚𝑎𝑥 − 𝑇𝑚𝑖𝑛
0

𝑖𝑓 𝑙𝑦 ≤ 𝑙𝑦,𝑚𝑎𝑥 ; 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑙𝑥 ≤ 𝑙𝑥,𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝑖𝑓 𝑙𝑦 > 𝑙𝑦,𝑚𝑎𝑥 ; 𝑜𝑟 𝑙𝑥 > 𝑙𝑥,𝑚𝑎𝑥
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where, 𝑇𝑓 is the threat value corresponding to the hazardous object; 𝑙𝑥 and 𝑙𝑦 are
the longitudinal distance and latitudinal distance in centimeters (cm) to the detected hazard
from the vehicle, respectively; 𝑙𝑥,𝑚𝑎𝑥 and 𝑙𝑦,𝑚𝑎𝑥 is the maximum longitudinal distance and
maximum latitudinal distance, correspondingly, to consider the hazard as a threat; and 𝑇 is
the threat value calculated from the longitudinal and the latitudinal distance. Then, the
value of 𝑇 is normalized using the Min-Max normalization technique to obtain a value
between 0 to +1 to determine the final threat value, 𝑇𝑓 (Suarez-Alvarez et al. 2012)(“About
Feature Scaling and Normalization” n.d.). In our experiment, the author has selected 𝑙𝑥,𝑚𝑎𝑥
as 6000cm as this is the Radar’s maximum range of finding an object in our experimental
setup, and 𝑙𝑦,𝑚𝑎𝑥 is selected as 370 cm, which is the standard lane width of a roadway. The
author can visualize the relationship between the threat value, and longitudinal and
latitudinal distance in Figure 1. 3.
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Figure 1. 3 Heatmap for the threat value based on the longitudinal and latitudinal
distance of a hazardous object using Radar sensor data (Islam et al. 2019).
Procedure 2 – threat value determination using image segmentation
In this procedure, instead of using a Radar sensor, the author used the segmented
image to calculate the threat value. In this way, the author can eliminate the use of any
sensor data besides the camera video feed. After the image segmentation, the author gets
the image coordinates (𝑥, 𝑦) of the hazard. As the camera is located at the center dashboard
of the vehicle facing the front roadway, the author measures the relative distance of the
𝑤

hazardous object in the image of size (ℎ, 𝑤), from the bottom center pixel, (ℎ, 2 ) to quantify
the threat. The author calculates the threat based on the location of the hazard in the
segmented image using the following equation:
𝑤 2
(𝑥 − ℎ)2 + (𝑦 − 2 )
𝑇𝑓 = 1 − √
𝑤 2
ℎ2 + ( 2 )
where, 𝑇𝑓 is the threat value corresponding to the hazardous object located in the
segmented image at location (𝑥, 𝑦) pixels, where (𝑥, 𝑦) is the pixel value closest to the
𝑤

bottom center pixel, (ℎ, 2 ), of the image. The value of ℎ and 𝑤 indicates the height and
width of the image, respectively. As the camera of the vehicle is located at the center of
the vehicle facing the front roadway, the author subtracts ℎ and

𝑤
2

values from the 𝑥 and 𝑦

values, respectively, to obtain the longitudinal and latitudinal distance of the hazard relative
to the front center of the vehicle. As the author described the equation above, the author
calculates the threat value. The author can visualize the threat value in Figure 1. 4, where
the threat value decreases as the object moves from the center bottom pixel of the image.
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Figure 1. 4 Heatmap for the threat value based on the location of hazard using pixel
value from the segmented image (Islam et al. 2019).
DNN-based autonomous vehicle driving model
In our study, the author have implemented an autonomous vehicle driving model
similar to DAVE-2, an end-to-end autonomous vehicle driving model (Bojarski et al.
2016). As shown in Figure 1. 5, the network receives an input image of 400x600x3 pixels
and produces a steering wheel angle as an output. This network includes one lambda layer,
one normalization layer, five convolution layers (Conv2D), and four fully connected (FC)
layers. The author has used a 5x5 kernel (i.e., filters) and 2x2 stride (i.e., the increment of
kernel movement) in the first 3 Conv2D layers, and a 1x1 stride and a 3x3 kernel in the
last two Conv2D layers. The entire network contains 7,970,619 trainable parameters.
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Figure 1. 5 CNN-based end-to-end autonomous vehicle driving model used in this
study (Islam et al. 2019).
The author trains our driving model of an autonomous vehicle from the output of
the hazard analysis and avoidance model followed by the deployment to test the
performance. After the training, our trained autonomous vehicle driving model is aware of
hazardous objects on the roadway and produces a steering wheel angle to navigate safely
around the hazard.

Experimental setup
In the experimental setup, the author describes the data collection method, data
preparation, and data augmentation; and finally, the author trains and validates the DNNbased autonomous vehicle driving model. The steps of our experiment setup are as follows:
Data Collection
For this study, the author has used the robotics simulation platform Webots
(Cyberbotics Ltd. 2013) to create the roadway environment with hazardous objects and to
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collect the data including the driving attributes of the camera image, timestamp, location,
vehicle speed, and steering wheel angle. The following subsections describe the collection
procedure of the dataset.
Roadway Environment Setup
The roadway built in the simulation consists of two lanes in each direction and
1663m in length with 16 curves (having 45 degrees to 90 degrees radius of curvature) and
two intersections as shown in Figure 1. 6. Six additional non-autonomous vehicles are
placed randomly on the roadway. The hazardous debris, which includes five objects: rocks,
wooden boxes, oil barrels, wooden pallets, and sections of pipe are created in Webots
(Cyberbotics Ltd. 2013) and placed randomly on the roadway as shown in Figure 1. 6.

Figure 1. 6 Roadway environment setup for an autonomous vehicle with hazardous
objects (Islam et al. 2019).
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Autonomous Vehicle Setup
For collecting the data, the autonomous vehicle is equipped with three dashboard
cameras, a front, left and right camera (as shown in Figure 1. 7), and a Radar sensor. The
data collected using these cameras are used to train the end-to-end autonomous vehicle
driving model. For example, as seen in Figure 1. 8, the images collected by the left and
right camera differ from the center camera. After training, the autonomous vehicle uses
only a single front camera to navigate through the roadway, similar to the DAVE-2 system
(Bojarski et al. 2016). In our developed driving model, the author used the Delphi ESR
Radar sensor, which is commercially used in the existing autonomous vehicles
(AutonomouStuff 2013). The author used the medium-range mode configurations
(horizontal field of view of 90 degrees and a maximum range of 6000 cm) of the Radar
sensor in our autonomous vehicle (“Webots Documentation: Radar Sensors” n.d.). The
author has also equipped the vehicle with three other Radar sensors in three directions (left,
right, and back side) for monitoring the near-by traffic condition and vehicles. These
Radars sensors are also configured in the medium range mode.

Figure 1. 7 Camera placements in the autonomous vehicle (left, center, and right
cameras) (Islam et al. 2019).
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Figure 1. 8 Example of images collected by the three cameras in the autonomous
vehicle (left, center, and right camera images (from left to right)) (Islam et al. 2019)
Data Preparation
After collecting the data, the author prepares the image dataset for training the endto-end driving model by normalizing and resizing. As shown in Figure 1. 9, the steering
wheel angle output is normalized between the values of -0.5 and +0.5, where a positive
value indicates the steering to the right, and a negative value represents steering to the left
using linear transformation following this equation:
𝜃𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑑 = −0.5 + max (0, min (1.0 ,

𝜃𝑟𝑎𝑤− 𝜃𝑚𝑖𝑛
))
𝜃𝑚𝑎𝑥 − 𝜃𝑚𝑖𝑛

where, 𝜃𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑑 is the normalized steering angle between -0.5 and +0.5; 𝜃𝑟𝑎𝑤 is
the actual steering wheel angle (in radians) measured from the vehicle; 𝜃𝑚𝑎𝑥 and 𝜃𝑚𝑖𝑛 are
the maximum and minimum steering wheel angle, respectively. The author also normalize
the input images for training, which is necessary to improve the DNN model performance
(Zha et al. 2015). Normalization is also done on the input images. The red, green, and blue
(RGB) channel values of the input images are normalized between the values of -1.0 and
+1.0, and their top 200 pixels are cropped using a Lambda layer (as shown Figure 1. 10)
as the top portion of the image is not necessary to predict the steering wheel angle and
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doing so does not impact the steering wheel angle output of the driving model. For all data
collected, the author used an online image annotation tool, LabelMe (Russell et al. 2008),
for labeling the hazardous object and segmented image. Using this tool, the author has
created the ground truth data for training the image segmentation model for detecting and
segmenting the hazards in an image.

Figure 1. 9 Example of a normalized steering wheel angle plot from the training
dataset (Islam et al. 2019).

Figure 1. 10 Example of an original and cropped image in the training dataset (Islam
et al. 2019).
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Data Augmentation
To obtain satisfactory performance from the driving model, it is necessary to train
the model on multiple training datasets. Using the techniques of data augmentation, the
author created additional data from the existing data through affine transformation (Tian et
al. 2017), specifically random rotation, random brightness change, and horizontal flipping
of the images, to double the size of the dataset as shown in Table 1. 1. From our first
simulation, the author has collected 1390 images in total, and the author has split the image
dataset in training (i.e., 1112 images) and validation dataset (i.e., 278 images) as shown in
column 2 of Table 1. 1. Then the author has doubled the dataset size (i.e., 2780 images)
using data augmentation as presented in column 3 of Table 1. 1. Among these 2780 images,
2224 images are used for training, and the remaining 556 images are used for validation.
Among the 2224 images used for training, 468 images contained hazards. Furthermore, the
author has collected 104 images from a second simulation where all the images contained
hazards. These 104 images are used to evaluate or test the driving model performance.
Table 1. 1 Dataset description
Dataset type

Collected

Dataset

dataset size

data augmentation

Dataset size

1390

2780

Training dataset size

1112

2224

Validation dataset size

278

556

Testing dataset size

(all

containing 52

hazard)

20

104

size

after

Model Training and Validation
After the development of the end-to-end autonomous vehicle driving model, the author
trains it using the augmented dataset. This dataset is divided into two, 80% in a training set
(2224 images as per Table 1. 1) and the remaining 20% in a validation set (556 images as
per Table 1). The author then trains three models for our evaluation:
Case 1: A model trained on a dataset that includes hazards but without considering
them as a separate input feature.
Case 2: A model trained on a dataset that considers hazards as separate input features
and uses a distance measurement sensor and image segmentation. In this case, the threat
value is determined using a distance measurement sensor (Radar in our case), following
Procedure 1 as described in the method section.
Case 3: A model trained on a dataset that considers hazards as separate input features
and uses image segmentation. In this case, the threat value is determined using the image
segmentation, following Procedure 2 as described in the method section.

For the training of the autonomous vehicle driving model, the author used the Adam
optimizer that can change the learning rate dynamically (Konur 2015). The mean square
error based loss function, a dropout rate of 0.5 in the last four FC layers, and L2
regularization are used to reduce overfitting and under-fitting and to minimize training
error (Baldi and Sadowski 2013). The author useed model checkpoints to stop the training
when the validation loss is not decreasing over time (“Keras,” n.d.). Figure 1. 11 shows the
performance of the model training for Case 1, where the training is stopped after 14 epochs
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because the model does not exhibit much improvement after 11 epochs. The author
observes no overfitting or under-fitting during the training. In Case 2, the model stopped
training after 16 epochs, and in Case 3, the model stopped the training after 15 epochs.

Figure 1. 11 Training and validation performance of the end-to-end driving model for
Case 1, Case 2, and Case 3 on the training and validation dataset (Islam et al. 2019).
Analysis results
After training and validating the model using the dataset from the first simulation,
the author evaluates the trained end-to-end autonomous vehicle driving model using the
test dataset of 104 images (as depicted in Table 1. 1). The author created this dataset of 104
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images from a second simulation where all debris are placed in the middle of the driving
lane, and the author measured the predicted steering wheel angle for each test image. In
this second simulation, first, the author creates the ground truth by manually driving the
vehicle on the roadway. Then the author deploys the trained end-to-end autonomous
vehicle driving model for Case 1, Case 2, and Case 3. The author then analyzes the
performance of the model for each case using the following quantitative measures: root
means square error (RMSE) and mean absolute error (MAE), and a qualitative measure
through visualization.
Quantitative Results of Model Performance
The quantitative results include the RMSE and the MAE, which are measured by
comparing the predicted steering wheel angle with the actual steering wheel angle (i.e.,
ground truth data). The author defines the RMSE and MAE as follows:
𝑁

1
𝑅𝑀𝑆𝐸 = √ ∑(𝐺𝑖 − 𝑃𝑖 )2
𝑁
𝑖=1

𝑁

1
𝑀𝐴𝐸 =
∑(|𝐺𝑖 − 𝑃𝑖 |)
𝑁
𝑖=1

where N is the total number of images in the testing dataset; and 𝐺𝑖 and 𝑃𝑖 are the
ground truth and predicted steering wheel angle, respectively, for the 𝑖 𝑡ℎ image of the
testing dataset. As shown in Figure 1. 12, both the RMSE and MAE are higher for Case 1
than Case 2 and Case 3. A lower RMSE and MAE indicate that the predicted steering wheel
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angle is closely following the actual steering wheel angle or ground truth data related to
steering wheel angle.

Figure 1. 12 Error measurement on the testing dataset (Islam et al. 2019).
The author measured the steering wheel angle prediction accuracy and
improvement of Case 2 and Case 3, over Case 1. By comparing 𝑅𝑀𝑆𝐸 of Case 2 and Case
3 with 𝑅𝑀𝑆𝐸𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑒1 , the author calculates the steering wheel angle prediction improvement
based on the equation below:
| 𝑅𝑀𝑆𝐸 − 𝑅𝑀𝑆𝐸𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑒1 |
𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑖𝑚𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 = (
× 100) %
𝑅𝑀𝑆𝐸𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑒1
Based on our experiment, the author found a 21% improvement in the steering
wheel angle prediction of Case 2 over Case 1, and 18% improvement in the steering wheel
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angle prediction of Case 3 over Case 1. The results suggest that both Case 2 and Case 3
improve autonomous vehicle navigation to avoid an unexpected hazard on the roadway.
Qualitative Results for Driving Direction
Figure 1. 13 shows the qualitative results of our study on the autonomous vehicle
driving direction. To obtain the qualitative measurement, the author transforms the steering
wheel angle (-0.5 to +0.5) into a driving direction angle (-25 degrees to +25 degrees) using
a linear transformation. In Webots, the steering wheel angle follows the Ackermann
geometry, representing a linear relationship between steering wheel angle and driving
direction (Cyberbotics Ltd. 2013)(Mitchell, Staniforth, and Scott 2006). The prediction
accuracy can be presented qualitatively by observing the driving direction angle or angle
of movement of the autonomous vehicle. For example, Figure 1. 13 shows that the
continuous steering wheel output of data from the time step of 64000 milliseconds (ms) to
72000ms window for ground truth, Case 1, Case 2, and Case 3. In the presence of a hazard
on the roadway, the autonomous vehicle driving model is producing the output for
maneuvering the autonomous vehicle. According to Figure 1. 13, the autonomous vehicle
is moving towards the left for each case. For example, in Case 1, at time step 66000ms, the
predicted driving direction is +5.2 degrees, causing the car to move closer to the hazard
(represented here as a box) compared to Case 2 and Case 3. However, in Case 2 and Case
3, the predicted driving direction is +11.7 degree and +9.28 degree, respectively, which is
a value closer to the ground truth than in Case 1. Overall, the qualitative results indicate
better accuracy prediction for Case 2 and Case 3 than for Case 1.
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Figure 1. 13 Qualitative results of ground truth, Case 1, Case 2, and Case 3 of the
driving direction (Islam et al. 2019).
Quantitative Results for Driving Direction
Following the Frenet coordinate system, the author has performed quantitative
analyses of hazard avoidance. In a Frenet coordinate system, the longitudinal movement
and latitudinal movement are represented in the x-axis and y-axis, respectively (Houenou
et al. 2013). Instead of following the Frenet coordinate system for the performance
evaluation, the author plotted the time step in the x-axis and latitudinal movement in the y-
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axis (see Figure 1. 14) to show the deviation of latitudinal movement of an autonomous
vehicle and how the vehicle avoids a hazardous object for different cases (as described in
the ‘Model Training and Validation’ subsection) over the time. The author analyzed the
trajectory of the autonomous vehicle and calculate the RMSE between the vehicle
trajectory of each case and the ground truth. In Figure 1. 14, the author presents the
autonomous vehicle trajectories for all three cases from the time step 62000ms to 72000ms
to show how accurately the vehicle following the ground truth trajectory data for each case
to avoid the hazardous object. For Case 2, the vehicle trajectory produced from the
autonomous vehicle driving systems is closely following the ground truth vehicle trajectory
compared to Case 1 and Case 3. However, in all cases, i.e., Case 1, Case 2, and Case 3, the
vehicle can avoid the hazard (Figure 1. 14). In Case 1, the RMSE value was 0.52. On the
other hand, the RMSE values for Case 2 and Case 3 are 0.07 and 0.23, respectively. The
author performed a statistical significance test (pairwise t-test) between the ground truth
and each case separately at a 95% confidence interval. The author finds that Case 1 is
significantly different from the ground truth at a 95% confidence interval. However, Case
2, which uses both image segmentation and a distance measurement sensor, and Case 3,
which only uses the segmented image, are not significantly different from the ground truth.
Thus, based on the statistical analyses of Case 2 and Case 3, the author achieves the same
level of performance using image segmentation, and not using any additional distance
measurement sensor, i.e., Radar.
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Figure 1. 14 Trajectory of the autonomous vehicle for ground truth, Case 1, Case 2,
and Case 3 (Islam et al. 2019).
Chapter Conclusions
Detecting unexpected hazards on a roadway is a crucial task for the safe operation
of an autonomous vehicle. In this work, the author developed and evaluated a DNN-based
driving system for autonomous vehicles in an unexpected hazardous roadway environment.
First, the author detects the hazard, and then using semantic segmentation, the author
extracts the hazard information and perform data fusion to improve the navigation of an
autonomous vehicle. This study makes the following contributions to the current body of
research: (i) the author evaluates the effect of the hazardous roadway environment on the
DNN-based driving system of an autonomous vehicle; (ii) the author develops a DNNbased driving system for autonomous driving that can address an unexpected hazardous
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roadway environment and can navigate the autonomous vehicle safely through this
environment. More specifically, the author explored the object detection and semantic
segmentation based deep learning models to address an unsafe navigational problem; (iii)
the author

contributes a new dataset that can be used by the autonomous vehicle

community to improve the driving model in unexpected hazardous roadway environment.
Based on the analysis result, the author concludes that our method improved the safety of
the autonomous vehicle by 21% in terms of avoiding hazards, compared to a vision-based
navigation system of autonomous vehicles having no hazard detection and segmentation
as separate input features. Future work will include fusing the temporal and spatial
information into the DNN-based model, potentially further improving the safety of
autonomous vehicles operating in an unexpected hazardous roadway environment.
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CHAPTER TWO
DEVELOPMENT AND PERFORMANCE EVALUATION OF A CONNECTED
VEHICLE APPLICATION DEVELOPMENT PLATFORM (CVDEP)

Introduction
Connected vehicle (CV) application developers need a development platform to
build, test, and debug real-world CV applications, such as safety, mobility, and
environmental applications, in edge-centric cyber-physical systems. Our objective is to
develop and evaluate a scalable and secure CV application development platform (CVDeP)
that enables application developers to build, test, and debug CV applications in real-time
while meeting the functional requirements of any CV applications. The author evaluated
the efficacy of the CVDeP using two types of CV applications (one safety and one mobility
application) and validated them through field experiments at the South Carolina Connected
Vehicle Testbed (SC-CVT). Our analyses show that the CVDeP satisfies the functional
requirements in terms of latency and throughput of a CV application while maintaining the
scalability and security of the platform and applications (Islam et al. 2020).
The emerging connected vehicle (CV) environment consists of different
components, such as vehicle onboard units (OBUs), and roadside units (RSUs), which are
capable of exchanging data with each other as well as communicating with personal
devices (e.g., cell phone), sensors (e.g., camera sensors), and traffic management centers
(TMCs) (Sotelo et al. 2012). With integrated computing and control capabilities, these
connected physical components communicate with each other to form a cyber-physical
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system (CPS). The architecture reference for cooperative and intelligent transportation
(ARC-IT), which has been developed with the sponsorship of the U.S. Department of
Transportation (USDOT), has listed the functional requirements and provided the
implementation guidelines of over a hundred CV applications for safety, mobility, and
environmental benefits (ARC-IT 2019). For example, “vehicle data for traffic operations
(2)” is a CV application, which uses CV data obtained from vehicle OBUs to support
roadway traffic operations. To develop such CV applications for an edge-centric CPS,
developers need a dedicated platform where they can build, test, and debug CV
applications. The operational data environment (ODE) system, which is being developed
by Intelligent Transportation Systems Joint Program Office (ITS JPO n.d.), is a real-time
data collection and distribution software system that collects, processes, and distributes
data to different components of the CV environment, such as CVs themselves, personal
mobile devices, infrastructure components (e.g., traffic signal) and sensors (e.g., camera
and environmental sensor). Although a user can stream CV data through the ODE platform
in real-time for developing a CV application, it does not provide a platform for the
application developers to build, test, and debug CV applications. Thus, it is critical to
develop an application development platform and evaluate the platform in terms of latency
and throughput to satisfy the temporal and spatial requirements of CV applications (Du et
al. 2018).
Considering a large-scale deployment of connected vehicle CPS, the concept of
edge computing is introduced as the underlying computing approach (Rayamajhi et al.
2017). Edge computing has the potential benefits for enabling reduced communication
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latency and increased scalability. Such benefits are a result of bringing resources, such as
storage, and computational resources, closer to the edge (Lopez et al. 2015)(Grethe authors
et al. 2017). In an edge-centric CPS, the resources for communication, computation,
control, and storage are placed at different edge layers (e.g., a mobile edge as a vehicle, a
fixed edge as a roadside infrastructure, and a system edge as a backend server or TMC) in
a CV environment (Rayamajhi et al. 2017). Therefore, a CV application can be divided
into sub-applications where sub-applications of a CV application run in different edge
layers depending on the requirements of an application.
Major challenges for developing a CV application development platform for an
edge-centric CPS are to (a) collect, process, and distribute data while running multiple CV
applications concurrently in real-time in different edge layers; and (b) provide the
scalability and security of the platform and applications. The objective of this study is to
develop and evaluate a scalable and secure CV application development platform that
handles real-time data from CVs in an edge-centric CPS and can satisfy the requirements
imposed by CV applications. This platform, which the author calls ‘connected vehicle
application development platform (CVDeP)’ has been designed to hide the underlying lowlevel software, hardware, and associated details. An application development graphical
user interface provides the application developers easy and secure access to the edge
devices. The access control and credential management module in the application
development platform prevents unwanted access to the edge devices, which provides
platform security. In addition, the application security module prevents malicious
operations or activities propagated through an application in an edge-centric CPS. In this
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study, a policy-based security system is utilized to provide application security against
cyberattacks. However, developing security policies for detecting different types of
cyberattacks and identifying related countermeasures are not the focus of this study.
The author conducted experiments to evaluate the efficacy of the CVDeP using a
safety application (i.e., “forward collision warning (FCW)” (ARC-IT 2019)) and a mobility
application (i.e., vehicle data for traffic operations (ARC-IT 2019)). These applications
were developed and evaluated in an emulated environment and later validated in a realworld edge-centric South Carolina Connected Vehicle Testbed (SC-CVT), which is located
at Clemson, South Carolina. The FCW application was selected for our experiment, as it is
a fundamental application for vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V) safety (8). Similarly, the vehicle
data for traffic operations application was selected, because this application supports many
other vehicle-to-infrastructure (V2I) safety and mobility applications, such as cooperative
adaptive cruise control, incident detection, and implementation of localized roadway traffic
operational strategies (e.g., altering signal timing based on traffic flows, freeway speed
harmonization, and optimization of ramp metering rates) (ARC-IT 2019). In addition, the
efficacy of the CVDeP was presented using two communication-related measures of
effectiveness, which are latency and throughput.

Contribution of the study
The primary contribution of this study is the development of an architecture for an
edge-centric CV application development platform (Islam et al. 2020). In this study, the
author systemically developed the architecture of the CVDeP and evaluated and validated

33

the CVDeP through experiments. In the “Conceptual Development and Implementation of
CVDeP” subsection of the “Connected Vehicle Application Development Platform
(CVDeP)” section, the author presented the architecture of the application development
platform and defined each module of this architecture. The architecture of the development
platform supports modular development so that any user can easily include additional
modules (e.g., adding an energy optimization module at mobile and fixed edge levels for
an eco-driving application) into the development platform if and when needed.
Furthermore, the author published the source code of the CVDeP on GitHub, an opensource platform, so that any external users can use it and contribute to expanding its utility
of CVDeP by adding more modules (Islam 2019). The CVDeP open-source software will
be maintained through a git version-control system.

Related work
To develop the CVDeP that uses real-time CV data, the author reviewed existing
work related to the CV applications development requirements, and developer access
control and application security.
CV Application Development Requirements
CV applications are bounded by temporal and spatial requirements for providing
the desired services (Karagiannis et al. 2011). If CV data are not received within the
temporal and spatial threshold as required by a CV application, CV data will not have any
efficacy for real-time applications. The Michigan connected vehicle testbed ‘Proof of
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concept test report’ categorized CV data by time and spatial contexts (U.S. Department of
Transportation (US DOT) 2010), meaning that timestamp information and location
information should be included in the CV data.
Application developers may require two kinds of data depending on the application,
namely real-time disaggregated data and aggregated data. For example, applications such
as incident detection applications require real-time disaggregated data for running and
testing of algorithms (Du et al. 2018), thus making it necessary for the platform to provide
such data. On the other hand, applications, such as those that provide queue warning after
every 5 minutes (Balke, Charara, and Sunkari 2014) may not require the disaggregated
data, but aggregated data is sufficient. A CV environment is considered to be one of the
largest distributed networks of the near future (Qian and Moayeri 2008). As the size of the
network grows (e.g., number of vehicles, sensors, and roadside infrastructures), the demand
for data will also increase (Baker et al. 2016). Thus, a platform for the CV application
developers needs to be designed in such a way so that it can handle a high demand of data
without compromising the quality of service (in terms of temporal and spatial
requirements). Thus, in providing the data to the users, the CVDeP needs to meet the
application requirement in terms of latency and throughput and must be capable of handling
the scalability issue related to the increasing number of connected vehicles, sensors, and
roadside infrastructures.
Access Control and Application Security
Security is one of the major concerns in deploying CV applications because of the
safety-critical aspect of connected transportation systems (Zarki et al. 2002)(Raw, Kumar,
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and Singh 2013). The USDOT partnered with the automotive industry and industry security
experts to design and develop a state-of-the-art security framework and presented a security
concept called ‘security credential management system (SCMS)’ to provide privacy and
integrity to a CV system as well as provide CV application security. The data shared
between applications and edge devices need to be secured and the author needs to maintain
data confidentiality, integrity, and availability (ARC-IT 2019). One way to protect the data
from unwanted user access is to authenticate user information before sharing and streaming
data. In SCMS, fixed edges (e.g., a communication device (e.g., RSU) along with a
computing device (e.g., general-purpose processor)) will provide a certificate to a CV
application, which can be used by the application for exchanging messages (Whyte et al.
2013)(Ahmed-Zaid, F., Bai, F., Bai, S., Basnayake, C., Bellur, B., Brovold, S., Brown, G.,
Caminiti, L., Cunningham, D., Elzein, H., Hong, K., Ivan, J., Jiang, D., Kenney, J.,
Krishnan, H., Lovell, J., Maile, M., Masselink, D., McGlohon, E., Mudalige, P., Popov et
al. 2011). A registration authority (RA) and a certificate authority (CA) were considered
for providing the certificates. While an RA verifies the user request and checks the digital
signature, a CA issues a new digital certificate or renews a certificate. In our study, the
author adopted a security module for access control and credential management following
the SCMS. The application security management is adopted based on security policies
developed by (Islam et al. 2018). In this study, the author considered the access control and
credential management and application security, however, network security is not part of
this study.
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Connected vehicle application development platform (CVDeP)
Figure 2. 1 presented the conceptual development and implementation, and the
evaluation and validation of the CVDeP. In an edge-centric CPS, the CVDeP architecture
is developed including an application management platform and an application
development graphical user interface for CV application development. The application
management platform contains three modules: (i) control platform module; (ii)
communication module; and (iii) data warehouse module. The application development
graphical interface contains a graphical user interface through which an application
developer can develop and deploy any CV application in the edge devices. The control
platform module includes four sub-modules in total: (i) access control and credential
management; (ii) application security management; (iii) data collection and distribution;
and (iv) data broadcasting and receiving. The author evaluated and validated the CVDeP
using selected safety and mobility applications in two stages: (i) evaluation in an emulated
environment; and (ii) field validation in a real-world edge-centric SC-CVT. The safety
application is evaluated using communication and computational latency metrics. On the
other hand, the mobile application is evaluated using communication and computational
latency along with data transmission throughput (to test the scalability of the platform).
Later, the author explained the experimental set-up in the emulated and real-world
environment and CV applications for the evaluation of the CVDeP. In the following
sections, the author presented the study approach in detail for developing and evaluating
the CVDeP.
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Figure 2. 1 Approach for the CVDeP development, evaluation and validation (Islam
et al. 2020).
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Conceptual Development and Implementation of CVDeP
In an edge-centric CPS, the physical proximity of devices to the data source reduces
the wireless communication latency, and a layered architecture increases the scalability
(Mashrur Chowdhury et al. 2018). The edge-centric CPS as shown in Figure 2. 2 for a CV
system consists of three edge layers: (i) mobile edge (e.g., on-board sensors and computing
device inside a vehicle); (ii) fixed edge (e.g., roadside transportation data infrastructure);
and (iii) system edge (e.g., backend server at TMC) (Rayamajhi et al. 2017). This
hierarchical cyber-physical system architecture can address complexity and scale issues of
CV systems. Participating CVs in our system will act as mobile edges and are equipped
with a low latency communication device. Although the author considered DSRC in our
study, any low latency communication technology, such as 5G and LTE for Vehicles (LTEV) can be incorporated in our development platform. A fixed edge includes a generalpurpose processor (i.e., application development device) and a dedicated short-range
communication (DSRC)-based RSU. A fixed edge can communicate with mobile edges
using DSRC and communicate with the system edge using optical fiber or Wi-Fi. A fixed
edge can be extended to support a video camera and other sensing devices, such as weather
sensors and GPS. A system edge can be a single endpoint in a cloud server. Fixed edges
are connected to a system edge through a long-range communication option, such as optical
fiber or LTE/Wi-Fi. Mobile edges (edge layer 1) can exchange data with fixed edges (edge
layer 2) and system edges (edge layer 3) using DSRC and LTE/Wi-Fi communication,
respectively, as shown in Figure 2. 2.
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Figure 2. 2 The CVDeP architecture for an edge-centric CPS (Islam et al. 2020)
In an edge-centric CPS for CVs, each component generates different types of data.
For example, an OBU installed in a vehicle (i.e., mobile edge) broadcasts basic safety
messages (BSMs), which contain a vehicle’s information, such as location, speed,
direction, acceleration, and braking status (Kenney 2011). A fixed edge collects data from
the OBUs within its communication range, and acts as a primary gateway to transfer data
from CVs to the transportation infrastructures (e.g., system edge, which could represent a
TMC). For developing a CV application, developers need to interact with all of the edge
layers. Edge layers can be accessed through an application development graphical user
interface, which provides a way for a CV application developer to interact with the different
edges. Figure 2. 2 illustrates the architecture of the CVDeP for an edge-centric CPS, which
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comprises of application management platform and application development graphical
user interface.
Application Management Platform
The application management platform is responsible for the selection of an
appropriate communication medium for an application, and data collection, storage,
broadcasting, and distribution, while providing the security of the platform by enabling
secured access to the edge layers and security of the CV applications. As presented in
Figure 2. 2, application developers interact with the application management platform
through an application development graphical user interface. The application management
platform is a part of each edge layer of the edge-centric CPS. The application management
platform is made up of the following modules: (i) control platform module; (ii) data
warehouse module; and (iii) communication module. The following subsections describe
the conceptual development and implementation of each of the modules in detail.
Conceptual development of control platform module

The control platform module of the system edge (edge layer 3) supports three types
of sub-modules: (i) access control and credential management; (ii) application security
management; and (iii) data collection and distribution. On the other hand, the control
platform module of the fixed edge (edge layer 2) supports four types of sub-modules: (i)
access control and credential management; (ii) application security management; (iii) data
collection and distribution; and (iv) data broadcasting and receiving. However, the control
platform module of mobile edge (edge layer 1) includes: (i) access control and credential
management; (ii) application security management; and (iii) data broadcasting and
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receiving.
In an edge-centric CPS, edge devices continuously exchange data between different
edges. The data broadcasting and receiving module in the mobile edges and fixed edges
handles the continuous data exchange between other mobile edges and fixed edges. This
module continuously broadcasts and receives messages that can be used to develop CV
applications through application development graphical user interface. On the other hand,
the data collection and distribution module in fixed edges and system edges are responsible
to gather and distribute data to and from mobile edges, fixed edges, and system edge in
real-time. After the access control and credential management modules are activated, an
authenticated application developer can access, gather and visualize real-time streaming
data generated from different edges of an edge-centric CPS. In addition, the application
security management module is responsible for monitoring the data flow and securing the
application using security policies.
Implementation of control platform module

The control platform module contains the following sub-modules, and what sub-modules

are included in each layer varies by whether the edge device is a mobile, fixed or system
edge. Implementation overviews of these sub-modules are as follows:
 Access control and credential management. The access control and credential
management sub-module ensures that only authorized users have access to CVDeP
services. A CV application developer is authenticated via a login interface before giving
access to the edge-centric CPS testbed components. Permission-based access control is
implemented by providing access rights to application-specific data and services (e.g.,
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access to the BSMs, access to sensors data, access to the data warehouse) like an android
application system where permission are written in a manifest file prior to developers
develop an Android application (Felt et al. 2012). On the other hand, the credential
management system (CMS) is implemented based on the public key infrastructure (PKI),
which takes care of public key exchange that is needed for encrypting and authenticating
data using a digital signature. A digital signature is used to verify the authenticity of a
message. The CMS is built in such a way that the functionalities of SCMS presented by
the USDOT are replicated (Whyte et al. 2013)(Brecht et al. 2018). The author followed
the assumptions of the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA)
supported connected vehicle pilot program where V2V messages are digitally signed
with a digital signature, but not encrypted, and V2I messages are both signed and
encrypted (Weil 2017).
 Application security management. In order to provide security for any applications, a
data consumer and a data producer must be authenticated and complete certificate
exchange (data flow1 (DF1) and (data flow 2 (DF2)) to send any producer generated data
and receive any verified producer generated data, respectively (as shown in Figure 2. 3).
The access control and credential management module is used to authenticate and
exchange certificates to secure access (as described in the “access control and credential
management” module) to any edge devices. As presented in (Fernandes et al. 2016), the
author implemented a flow policy-based application security in the application security
management module, which contains trusted API and quarantine submodules. In our
study, the author implemented the flow policies using ‘<source, sink>’ tracking
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(Fernandes et al. 2016) in which the source is the producer of the data and sink is the
intended consumer of that data. The trusted API submodule removes any sensitive
information (e.g., drivers identify and vehicle ID of a mobile edge) from the producer
generated data (data flow 3 (DF3)). The quarantine submodule will remove any
unexpected or malicious data flows between a producer and a consumer that is not listed
in the flow policies. Flow policies can be pre-defined or can be changed by an
administrator (e.g., a certificate authority) dynamically. Finally, verified data from a
producer is passed to its intended consumer (data flow 4 (DF4)).

Figure 2. 3 Implementation of application security management module, and access
control and credential management module (Islam et al. 2020).

44

 Data collection and distribution. The data collection and distribution sub-module is the
core part of the fixed and system edges of the CVDeP. The author selected Kafka (Kreps,
Narkhede, and Rao 2011) as a broker-based data collection and distribution system
because of the following efficacies: (i) high throughput; (ii) low latency; (ii) reliability
of data delivery and (iv) scalability. In a publish-subscribe based broker-system, such as
Kafka, Message queuing telemetry transport (MQTT) and WebSphere, data producers
(e.g., mobile edges, fixed edges, connected vehicle applications) produce and publish
data to the broker, whereas the data consumers (e.g., fixed edge, connected vehicle
applications) subscribe and consume the data available at the broker. By tagging
individual data elements with a label based on a topic, producers (e.g., a connected
vehicle) can produce data on a particular topic, and consumers (e.g., a CV application)
can subscribe and consume the data of that topic. The broker receives data from
producers and immediately makes the data available for consumers to consume. As a
result, producers and consumers can generate and consume data, respectively,
asynchronously and independently reducing the latency and improving reliability.
 Data broadcasting and receiving. The data broadcasting and receiving sub-module is
developed for mobile edges and fixed edges, where it is responsible for broadcasting
BSMs and receiving BSMs from other mobile edges and fixed edges. In our
implementation, each mobile edge broadcasts BSMs at a default rate of 10Hz and each
BSM contains necessary attributes for safety applications (e.g., position, speed, and
direction) (Kenney 2011)(Park and Kim 2012). Additionally, each fixed edge broadcasts
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safety warnings (e.g., intersection safety warning) at a rate of 10Hz, which are generated
for V2I applications. In addition, each mobile edge and each fixed edge receives BSMs
from all other mobile edges and fixed edges within their corresponding communication
range.
Conceptual development of data warehouse module

The data warehouse module stores the data generated from different edge devices,

roadside sensors, and applications deployed in the fixed and system edge layers. It is a
distributed storage system that resides in fixed edges and system edges. The purpose of the
data warehouse module is to store and provide the necessary historical data that is needed
by the CV application developers and/or edge layers. As a mobile edge is limited by
computation power and storage size, the author did not include a data warehouse module
in mobile edges. In fixed edges and system edges, the structure of the data warehouse
module is such that it can support and store both structured (e.g., GPS data) and
unstructured data (e.g., text and images). A structured data has a strict tabular format whose
column size and attributes of each entity are defined. Examples of structured data include
any data that can be stored in delimited formats, spreadsheets, or SQL tables, whose
columns are defined. A semi-structured data includes data whose fields are defined but
organized hierarchically. Examples include data stored in extensible markup language
(XML) or JavaScript object notation (JSON) formats. Unstructured data, such as pictures,
videos, and textual data, do not have any structural organization associated with the data
itself.
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Implementation of data warehouse module

In our implementation, to support structured, semi-structured, as well as

unstructured data, the author used MySQL for structured data in a tabular format, and
MongoDB for semi-structured and unstructured data in JSON format. The structured, semistructured, and unstructured data together produces a huge amount of data in terms of
volume. Realistically, CV applications do not need to access the raw data in their original
format. Thus, a big data engineering infrastructure can be employed to reduce and
compress raw data for further direct access by CV applications. In our case, the author used
Clemson University’s Cypress cluster for this purpose. Cypress is a Hadoop-based big data
cluster and has both Hadoop Distributed File System (“Hadoop,” n.d.) for large-scale data
storage and Apache Spark for big data processing (Zaharia et al. 2010).
Conceptual development of communication module

The communication module decides the best available communication medium
based on the communication latency requirement of an application. Developers will
provide the requirements of an application to the communication module through the
application development graphical user interface, and then the communication module
creates an abstraction layer to characterize communication network attributes of the
available communication networks. For example, the communication module could select
DSRC, 5G or LTE-V, or any low latency communication medium, from the available
communication mediums to satisfy the requirement of safety applications. While the
application is running in an edge device, the CVDeP will provide communication metadata
(e.g., available communication mediums, such as DSRC, 5G, LTE, LTE-V, and Wi-Fi, and
their average, maximum, and minimum transmission latency and throughput) for

47

evaluating the performance of the application. The decision for selecting a wireless
communication medium, by the communication module, will be completed based on the
characteristics of available communication mediums and the application requirements set
by the application developers.
Implementation of communication module

The communication module manages the underlying communication network

connectivity in an edge-centric CPS. The communication network services are
implemented in the network layer of each edge device to manage the connectivity using
the available communication mediums to connect with other edge devices. In our
communication module implementation, the discovery or searching of communication
mediums and their network characteristics are measured asynchronously. The
communication module selects a medium to use for transmitting and receiving data based
on the application requirements. The author added a metadata support layer in the
communication module to provide metadata to the application developers that can support
them to develop their applications. Through this metadata layer, developers will be able to
observe the communication attributes, such as signal strength, bandwidth utilization, and
data loss. A script running in the CVDeP provides communication attributes to the
developers through the application development graphical user interface, and developers
can evaluate the performance of an application through these attributes.
Application Development Graphical User Interface
Application developers can access the underlying edge devices of the edge-centric
CPS using a graphical user interface and can develop and deploy any CV application
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directly on the edge-centric CPS. Based on access control rights to the available services
(e.g., communication services and data storage service) of the platform and the
requirements of a CV application, an application developer can access different types of
data (e.g., real-time and historical data) from each layer through an application
development graphical user interface. Using this application development graphical user
interface, application developers can also request any specific data for a specific
application purpose. For example, developers can request historical data from the data
warehouse module to predict future roadway traffic conditions. Application development
graphical user interface will provide an interactive platform to the developers to build their
applications and test these applications by requesting real-time data from both mobile and
fixed edges, and historical data from the data warehouse module from both fixed and
system edges.

49

Figure 2. 4 Implementation of application development graphical user interface
(Islam et al. 2020).

As shown in Figure 2. 4, the application development graphical user interface is
divided into four blocks: (i) applications development services block (using this block a
developer can connect to the edge devices through an authentication procedure using the
accessibility details, such as username and password. After the authentication procedure,
developers will be provided with a list of available edge devices (e.g., location, number,
and type of edge devices), services (e.g., available communication mediums and their
characteristics), and sensors (e.g., GPS, camera) of each edge device.); (ii) applications
development block (inside this block, an application developer can implement an
application in an edge device using Python or C++); (iii) Applications development tools
(using this block, an application developer can develop, deploy, test, and debug an
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application in edge devices); and (iv) Applications output and performance measurement
block (after deploying an application, developers can observe and save the output and
performance data of an application through this block). The application development
graphical user interface is developed as a desktop application in C# (C sharp) as illustrated
in Figure 2. 4. Currently, the software has been developed for the Windows operating
systems as a proof-of-concept.

Experimental setup
This section describes the experimental set-up in an emulated environment as well
as a real-world environment to evaluate the efficacy of the CVDeP.
Experimental Setup in Emulated Environment
A developer can develop and evaluate the performance of the developed CV
applications in the emulated environment. In this environment, the developer will have
dedicated hardware to emulate the real-world edge-centric CPS. As shown in Figure 2. 5,
a developer can emulate mobile edges using hardware setup #1 and #2 and fixed edges
using hardware setup #3, where system edges are set-up in a dedicated server at Clemson
University. Each hardware setup (#1, #2, and #3) consists of one DSRC unit to send and
receive the DSRC messages, and a computing device for computation. Hardware setup #1
is used for developing the safety application whereas hardware setup #2 is used for
emulating other mobile edges for the safety application. For mobility and environmental
applications, only hardware setup #2 can be used for emulating mobile edges. Hardware
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setup #3 is used for creating any number of fixed edges where the location of fixed edges
is defined by a developer through the application development graphical user interface. A
dedicated server located at Clemson University is used for creating system edge instances.
In this emulated edge-centric CPS, mobile edges and fixed edges communicate with each
other using DSRC, and fixed edges and system edges communicate using the Clemson
University communication network, which includes an optical fiber and Wi-Fi
connections. In addition, developers can configure the number of edges in each layer as
required by an application. To generate the movement data of mobile edges, the movement
of the mobile edges is exported from the ‘Simulation of Urban Mobility (SUMO) (“DLR Institute of Transportation Systems - SUMO – Simulation of Urban MObility” 2017)’,
which is a microscopic traffic simulator software, as a SUMO trace file. Using this SUMO
trace file, developers can create any roadway environment, and generate any number of
emulated vehicles and their corresponding BSMs. A program running in mobile edges
reads that trace file and generates BSMs for each vehicle. Then, these BSMs are
broadcasted using DSRC to each vehicle. Fixed edges will receive BSMs from mobile
edges within their corresponding communication ranges. Developers can access the edges
through the CVDeP application development graphical user interface to develop and
evaluate the performance of the developed CV application.
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Figure 2. 5 CVDeP setup in an emulated edge-centric CPS (Islam et al. 2020).

The author implemented all the modules of the CVDeP in each layer, as shown in
Figure 2. 6. Hardware setup #1 and #2 represent the edge layer 1, Hardware setup #3
represents the edge layer 2, and the Server setup represents the edge layer 3 of an edgecentric CPS. The implemented modules of the CVDeP are (i) control platform module,
which consists of access control and credential management, application security
management, data collection and distribution, and data broadcasting and receiving; (ii)
communication module; and (iii) data warehouse module. The control platform module
resides in a computing device and is implemented in each hardware setup. However, the
data broadcasting and receiving sub-module of the control platform module resides in a
computing device, which is a part of each mobile and fixed edges. For the data warehouse
module, the author used an external hard disk drive (HDD) for storing data in the fixed
edges, and cloud storage for storing data in the system edge. In our case, an application
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developer interacts with each hardware through the Clemson University communication
network to develop, debug, and test a CV application.

Figure 2. 6 Implementation of CVDeP modules in an emulated edge-centric CPS (Islam
et al. 2020).
Experimental Setup in SC-CVT
The SC-CVT has three fixed edges, which are deployed along the Perimeter Road
in Clemson, South Carolina, and one system edge is deployed as the backend server
(Mashrur Chowdhury et al. 2018). The backend server is located at Clemson University
and connected to the Clemson University network. Two of the fixed edges are connected
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to the Clemson University network with an optical fiber link and one fixed edge is
connected to the Clemson University network with a Wi-Fi link. Each fixed edge has its
DSRC radio to communicate with mobile edges. Each mobile edge (primarily OBUs on
vehicles) is equipped with wireless communication devices. In our case, the author used
DSRC-enabled OBUs, although, any low latency communication mediums, such as 5G or
LTE-V can be used. As per our definition of a mobile edge, a connected vehicle will act as
a mobile edge and a vehicle owner will own a commercially available low latency
communication device (e.g., DSRC, 5G, or LTE-V enabled communication device) along
with a computing device for running an application at the vehicle level. Also, a vehicle
owner can install these communication and computing devices to create a mobile edge.

Evaluation and validation of CVDeP
For our experiments, the author developed a forward collision warning (FCW) as
a safety application and vehicle data for traffic operations as a mobility application (ARCIT 2019) using the CVDeP. Then, to prove the efficacy of the CVDeP, the FCW and vehicle
data for traffic operations applications are evaluated in an emulated environment and the
real-world SC-CVT (Mashrur Chowdhury et al. 2018).
Safety Application
For our experiment related to safety application, the author selected forward
collision warning (FCW) that considers two vehicles moving in the same direction on the
same lane in an uncongested urban traffic condition. The FCW application is based on the
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study by Xiang et.al.(Xiang, Qin, and Xiang 2014), where the FCW application uses the
vehicle kinematics (VK) model for generating collision warnings using DSRC
communication. Based on the VK model, the FCW application generates rear-end collision
warnings when two vehicles are closer than a defined safe distance. In our study, the
following equation is used for implementing an FCW application as suggested by Xiang
et.al.(Xiang, Qin, and Xiang 2014).

𝐷𝑤=

(𝑉𝑜 − 𝑉𝑡 )2
+𝑑
2∗ 𝑎

where 𝐷𝑤 is the distance threshold for collision warning; 𝑉𝑜 is the preceding
vehicle’s speed; and 𝑉𝑡 is the follower vehicle’s speed. The follower vehicle is the vehicle
where the FCW application is intended to run; d is calculated by adding half of the length
of the preceding vehicle with the half of the length of the following vehicle, and 𝑎 is set to
11.2 ft/s2 (American Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials
(AASHTO) 2011). Given the emulated environment within the CVDeP platform, as shown
in Figure 2. 5, it is possible to generate complex urban scenarios and develop and evaluate
appropriate FCW application corresponding to such scenarios. Using a complex urban
scenario, an application developer can develop an FCW application considering different
safety constraints within that environment.
Evaluation Scenarios
The author created two evaluation scenarios for evaluating the CVDeP as a safety
application development platform.
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Scenario 1: The preceding vehicle (hardware setup #2 in Figure 2. 5), and the follower
vehicle (hardware setup #1 in Figure 2. 5) is moving in the same direction on the same
lane at 20 mph and 30 mph, respectively.



Scenario 2: The preceding vehicle and follower vehicle both are moving at 30 mph
and the preceding vehicle stops suddenly.

In both scenarios, the FCW application is deployed in the follower vehicle, and forwardcollision warnings are generated based on the comparison between calculated safety
distance and the distance between two vehicles using real-time GPS data. To evaluate the
performance of the application, the author considered data delivery latency as a measure
of effectiveness. In this context, latency is the duration between the time when a BSM is
generated by a mobile edge and the time when the application produces an FCW message
in the follower vehicle. Here, latency includes network latency, computational latency, and
communication medium selection latency.
Evaluation in Emulated Environment
The author evaluated the FCW application, using the experimental setup as
described in the previous section. The application is developed using the CVDeP, and then
the application is tested using two evaluation scenarios. Table 2. 1 provides a summary of
latency recorded from both evaluation scenarios. For the evaluation of the FCW application
in the emulated environment, the author analyzed the BSMs of 200 seconds observation
period containing 4000 BSMs from two mobile edges to calculate the maximum,
minimum, and average latency. A connected vehicle broadcasts BSMs and receives BSMs
from other connected vehicles within its communication range. A CV safety application’s
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critical latency requirement represents the maximum acceptable time from generating
BSMs by a preceding vehicle to generating an FCW message by a follower vehicle within
the preceding vehicle’s communication range. If an FCW message is received by the driver
of the follower vehicle within this safety-critical latency requirement, the driver can take
action to avoid a collision after receiving a forward collision warning (Qing Xu et al. 2003).
In our case, the author selected 200 ms as a maximum safety-critical latency requirement
(Mashrur Chowdhury et al. 2018) in which a driver can decelerate at a deceleration rate of
11.2 ft/s2 (American Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials
(AASHTO) 2011), and avoid the forward collision if the warning message was delivered
within 200 ms. Therefore, the maximum end-to-end latency requirement is considered as
200 ms, which will ensure the driver to stop the vehicle in case of a forward collision
scenario. In our emulated experimental environment, the author found that the average
latency is 18 ms for both evaluation scenario 1 and scenario 2. However, the recorded
maximum latencies were 97 milliseconds (ms) and 79 ms, for scenarios 1 and 2,
respectively, which are below the safety-critical latency requirement for connected vehicles
(i.e., 200ms (Dey et al. 2016)). For the evaluation of the FCW application in the emulated
environment, the author analyzed the data of 200s containing 4000 BSMs from two mobile
edges to calculate the maximum, minimum, and average latency. In Table 2. 1, the author
presented the end-to-end latency, which includes communication network latency,
computational latency, and communication medium selection latency. The computational
latency for running the application is 1.5 ms, which is the same for both evaluation
scenarios. In addition, these FCW messages are sent to the mobile edge using the best
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available communication medium as decided by the communication module, which takes
about 0.5 ms on average to make such a determination. During this communication medium
selection process, all communication mediums (LTE, Wi-Fi, and DSRC) were running
simultaneously, and the communication module was monitoring these mediums
asynchronously and selects the best communication medium for a connected vehicle
application following the heterogeneous wireless networking concept for CVs (Dey et al.
2016).
Table 2. 1 Summary of Latency for FCW Application Evaluation
Latency requirements
End-to-End End-to-End
Evaluation
for Safety Application
Experiment
Latency in
Latency in
(Dey et al.
Latency
al Setup
Scenario
Scenario
2016)(Ahmed-Zaid et
Parameter
#1*
#2**
al. 2011)
Emulated
environment

SC-CVT

Maximum

97 ms

79 ms

Average

18 ms

18 ms

Minimum

4 ms

4 ms

Maximum

115 ms

107 ms

Average

65 ms

51 ms

Minimum

4 ms

5 ms

≤ 200 ms

Note: *Scenario #1: The preceding vehicle and follower vehicle are moving in the same
direction on the same lane at 20 mph and 30 mph, respectively; and ** Scenario #2:
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The preceding vehicle and follower vehicle both are moving at 30 mph and the
preceding vehicle stops suddenly.
Field Validation in SC-CVT
For our field evaluation of the FCW application in SC-CVT, the author followed
similar speed for the corresponding vehicles for both evaluation scenarios and measured
the end-to-end latency for the FCW application. Table 2. 1 provides a summary of end-toend latency recorded for both evaluation scenarios in the field experiments and an emulated
environment. Similar to the evaluation in an emulated environment, the author analyzed
the data sample of 200s containing 4000 BSMs from two mobile edges to calculate the
maximum, minimum, and average latency. The average end-to-end latency measured is 65
ms and 51 ms for scenarios 1 and 2, respectively. The maximum end-to-end latency
recorded for the test is 115 ms and 107 ms for scenarios 1 and 2, respectively, which is
below the safety-critical latency requirement (i.e., 200 ms (Dey et al. 2016)). In our field
experiment, the author observed a higher latency than the latency measured in the emulated
experimental setup because of the surrounding environmental effect or wireless
communication propagation loss. In Table 2. 1, the author presented the end-to-end latency
which includes the network latency, computational latency, and communication medium
selection latency. In both cases (scenarios 1 and 2), the author can validate that the
application developed using the CVDeP was able to satisfy the application’s safety-critical
latency requirement (≤200ms) in the field experiments.
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Mobility Application
The author evaluated the CVDeP using vehicle data for traffic operations
applications. This application collects CVs’ data (e.g., BSMs) to support traffic operations,
such as incident detection and localized traffic operational strategies (ARC-IT 2019). This
application is divided into two sub-applications: (i) sub-application 1: collect real-time
traffic data from mobile edges; (ii) sub-application 2: collect real-time traffic data from
fixed edges. The sub-application 1 runs in each fixed edge and sub-application 2 runs in
the system edge.
The author evaluated the scalability of the CVDeP to ensure the CV application
requirements are met in terms of latency and throughput. Here, the latency is the time
difference between the time of data generation at the edge-centric SC-CVT and the time
when the data is received by the users (e.g., CV applications). Data delivery latency
requirements for any mobility and environmental applications must be satisfied in order to
provide mobility and environmental services. As the CVDeP aims to support different
mobility and environmental applications, the author considered 1000 ms as the maximum
latency threshold to deliver the data from edge devices to the data consumers (e.g. CV
applications) following the recommendations from (Ahmed-Zaid et al. 2011). This 1000
ms will enable the near real-time operation of mobility applications, such as queue warning
and traffic rerouting applications. However, if the latency recommendations changes in the
future for any CV applications, the CVDeP can still be utilized by selecting appropriate
underlying technologies for different communication and computing devices to meet any
new requirements. The CVDeP provides a general architecture, which is independent of
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specific technologies. Our experiments demonstrate the efficacies of the CVDeP as an
application development platform using selected communication and computing
technologies. Also, the author needed to ensure a high throughput (i.e., the data transfer
rate), which means the high use of the allocated bandwidth. Our platform already satisfied
the spatial requirement of the application, as mobile edges will be within the
communication range of fixed edges.
Evaluation Scenarios
The author created two different scenarios for evaluating our application development
platform by varying the number of fixed edges and the number of mobile edges.


Scenario 1: One system edge and one fixed edge with varying numbers of mobile
edges (5, 10, 20, 30, 50, 100, 150, and 200).



Scenario 2: One system edge, varying number of fixed edges (1, 2, and 3), and 200
mobile edges (CVs) for each fixed edge.

For evaluation scenario 2, based on a fixed edge’s communication range, the maximum
number of CVs on Perimeter road approaching the intersection is 200 vehicles/hour/lane
during a congested traffic condition. For the evaluation in the emulated environment, the
author used SUMO to generate the movement data of mobile edges and calibrated the
traffic network so that traffic volume data from SUMO simulation matches, within a
tolerance level of 5%, with the field-collected data. For both scenarios, the author evaluated
the scalability of the application development platform in terms of data delivery latency
and throughput.
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Evaluation in Emulated Environment
The author implemented a data collection and distribution system (a broker-based
system) that is required for the real-time application development platform. The author
evaluated the scalability of the CVDeP considering a data collection and distribution
system, which is a broker-based system. In addition, the author compared the recorded endto-end latency with the latency requirement for the selected CV mobility application. As
shown in Figure 2. 7 Evaluation of CVDeP for mobility application using application
throughput and latency with the increasing number of mobile edge and fixed edge, the
throughput of the broker-based system is linearly increasing and reaches a maximum at 5.2
Mbits/s and 8.4 Mbits/sec, respectively. Higher throughput ensures reliable and scalable
services. The broker-based system (e.g., Kafka (“Apache Kafka” n.d.) for this experiment)
uses an asynchronous mode that can collect and distribute data in memory and send them
in batches in a single shot (Kreps, Narkhede, and Rao 2011). Because of this asynchronous
mode and sending data in batch, the broker-based system can provide the required
throughput. The broker-based system can adapt the throughput requirement by the
application as the number of mobile edges and fixed edge increases and thus can handle
more data as needed.
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Figure 2. 7 Evaluation of CVDeP for mobility application using application
throughput and latency (Islam et al. 2020).
The author observed that the CVDeP data collection and distribution system can
maintain a lower latency with the increasing number of mobile edges and fixed edges. The
increment of latency with the broker-based method is negligible for both scenarios
(scenarios 1 and 2). The reason is that the broker-based system uses an intelligent ‘sendfile’
method with zero-copy optimization (i.e., sending the data directly to the consumer without
any buffering or copying into memory) (“Apache Kafka” n.d.). Thus, the broker-based
system can maintain a lower message delivery latency irrespective of the number of
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producers and consumers thus ensuring scalability. In our experiment, the author used the
default configuration of a Kafka broker-based system (Kreps, Narkhede, and Rao 2011).
However, the configuration (e.g., topic partitions, replication number, and the number of
brokers) of Kafka's broker-based system can be configured easily to reduce the latency if
the latency is higher than the CV application threshold. In addition, by adding additional
data management brokers, as presented by (Du et al. 2018), the CVDeP can be scaled up
to receive and share data from additional connected data sources (e.g., personal handheld
devices, news media, and weather stations, traffic operators).
Field Validation in SC-CVT
The author evaluated the CVDeP in SC-CVT using five mobile edges (e.g., CVs)
in the field experiment. Table 2. 2 Summary of Latency for Mobility Application with Five
CVs. Table 2. 2 shows the summary of end-to-end latency when the author developed the
application in the CVDeP emulated environment and SC-CVT. The author observed higher
latency (maximum, average, and minimum) in the field than in the emulated environment.
In the field experiment, the data exchange using DSRC technology between the mobile
edges and fixed edges were affected by the environmental inferences, such as trees,
roadway slope, and curvature. This causes a higher variation in latency in the field than in
the emulated environment. However, the latency observed in the field was still far below
the application latency requirement (≤1000ms) for the selected mobility application.
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Table 2. 2 Summary of Latency for Mobility Application with Five CVs
End-to-End Latency
Latency requirements
Evaluation

Evaluation in

for Mobility Application

Latency

Emulated

Validation in

(U.S. Department of

Parameter

Environment

SC-CVT

Transportation (US DOT)
2010)

Maximum
Average
Minimum

115 ms

267 ms

65 ms

69 ms

4 ms

6 ms

≤1000 ms

Chapter Conclusions
CV technology holds the promise of improving the traffic safety and efficiency of
roadway traffic operations. In order to materialize CV benefits, the active participation of
CV researchers and developers is necessary. This can be hindered due to the lack of realworld application development platforms that use real-world and real-time data to support
the CV application development process including testing and debugging. Our research
related to the CV application development platform contributes directly by developing a
CV application development platform, CVDeP, for an edge-centric CPS. Using the
CVDeP, the CV application developers can interact with real-world edge devices, and
develop, test, and debug CV safety and mobility applications. From our experiments, it was
revealed that the applications developed using the CVDeP were able to satisfy the CV
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safety and mobility application latency requirements and maintain the required throughput
both for an increasing number of mobile edges and fixed edges. The author showed that
the forward collision warning (FCW) application (a safety application) developed using
the CVDeP can satisfy the safety-critical latency requirement (under 200 milliseconds for
an FCW application). Also, the vehicle data for traffic operations application (a mobility
application) developed using the CVDeP with a broker-based system shows about 400
milliseconds of latency with three fixed edges and 600 mobile edges, which is much lower
than the latency requirement (under 1000 milliseconds) of mobility applications. This
proves the scalability of our CVDeP while satisfying the latency requirement of CV
applications for an edge-centric CPS. The author published the source code of the CVDeP
is released on the Github platform.
As the CVDeP is being refined further, our follow-up studies of CVDeP includes
(i) evaluation of the fault tolerance and resiliency of the platform; (ii) evaluation of multiple
applications running simultaneously in multiple system edges, and merging information
from diverse data sources of a large roadway network (i.e., data residing at local or
city/county level, regional or state level, and/or national level); (iii) incorporation of data
from other traditional data sources (e.g., traffic signals, video detectors or loop detectors)
and non-traditional data sources (e.g., news media, weather sensors, social networking
sites); and (iv) strategy identification to make the system more secure by incorporating
different security threat detection and protection mechanisms against different malicious
activities including cyber-attacks.
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CHAPTER THREE
HYBRID QUANTUM-CLASSICAL NEURAL NETWORK FOR CLOUDSUPPORTED IN-VEHICLE CYBERATTACK DETECTION

Introduction
A classical computer works with ones and zeros, whereas a quantum computer uses
ones, zeros, and superpositions of ones and zeros, which enables quantum computers to
perform a vast number of calculations simultaneously compared to classical computers. In
a cloud-supported Internet-of-Things (IoT) environment, running a machine learning
application in quantum computers is often difficult, due to the existing limitations of the
current quantum devices. However, with the combination of quantum-classical neural
networks (NN), complex and high-dimensional features can be extracted by the classical
NN to a reduced but more informative feature space to be processed by the existing
quantum computers. In this study, the author develops a hybrid quantum-classical NN to
detect an amplitude shift cyber-attack on an in-vehicle control area network (CAN) dataset.
The author shows that using the hybrid quantum-classical NN, it is possible to achieve an
attack detection accuracy of 90%, which is higher than a comparable classical NN (61%)
alone or quantum NN alone (62%).
The decoherence and mechanical errors in quantum computers can make it harder
for the existing quantum computers to learn the underlying data pattern, affecting the
performance (Kulkarni, Kulkarni, and Pant 2020). With the recent advancement of nearterm quantum processors, it is possible to use a combination of classical and quantum
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computers to reduce errors. In a hybrid quantum-classical setup some computations are
performed in quantum computers and some computations are performed in classical
computers. Such a setup can be used in a cloud-based internet-of-things (IoT) environment,
where a control area network (CAN) bus is connected to the cloud using a CAN logger
attached to the OBD-II port of a vehicle. The CAN logger provides CAN bus data to the
cloud to run multiple IoT applications in the cloud while meeting the delay requirements
(e.g., data upload and download delay) of the vehicle’s operation (Figure 3. 1) (Nkenyereye
and Jang 2017)(Deng et al. 2020). In this chapter, the hybrid quantum-classical cyberattack
detection application will run in the cloud to detect a cyberattack on the in-vehicle CAN
bus. The author considers an amplitude shift cyberattack, where an attacker can
compromise an electronic control unit (ECU) locally or remotely and can perform an
amplitude shift attack on the in-vehicle CAN bus (M. Chowdhury, Islam, and Khan 2019).
As the amplitude shift attack changes the data field of a CAN frame randomly, the complex
nature of the attack makes it difficult to detect this kind of attack. Studies showed that CAN
bus used in existing vehicles do not have sufficient security features (Khan et al. 2020)
(Song, Woo, and Kim 2020), and the security can be improved using machine learning
techniques. The study by Song et al. shows an accuracy of 99% in detecting denial of
service (DoS) attacks. However, their method will not work in the case of an amplitude
shift attack, where the amplitude of a feature is shifted (up or down) randomly. The recent
study by Khan et al. shows a detection accuracy of 87% on detecting amplitude shift attack
using a deep neural network (Khan et al. 2020). To improve the attack detection accuracy,
the author combines a quantum machine learning method, more specifically a quantum
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neural network, with a classical neural network. By leveraging the advantages of the nearterm quantum computers, the study by Farhi & Neven presented a general quantum neural
network architecture that was able to classify a handwritten digit dataset (i.e., MNIST)
(Broughton et al. 2020)(Farhi and Neven 2018). However, using such a quantum-only
approach yields a lower classification accuracy. A more recent study shows the use of a
hybrid quantum-classical neural network (NN) approach can achieve a higher classification
accuracy (Mari et al. 2020). However, this approach has not been applied in a cloud-based
in-vehicle cyberattack detection system. Using a cloud-based hybrid quantum-classical
NN, the author overcomes the existing limitations of quantum computers, and develop a
quantum computing application for in-vehicle cyberattack detection.

Figure 3. 1 Cloud based In-vehicle Cyberattack Detection System
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Cyberattack Detection in IoT Cloud
In our hybrid quantum-classical NN (Figure 3. 2), first, the author preprocess the
in-vehicle CAN bus dataset and construct a CAN image dataset (Song, Woo, and Kim
2020). Then the author performs feature extraction using classical convolution neural
network (CNN), convert the output from the classical CNN into quantum data, and use the
quantum data into a quantum NN to detect an in-vehicle cyberattack.

Figure 3. 2 Hybrid quantum-classical neural network.
Preparing dataset
The author constructs a 13 × 13 CAN image from 13 consecutive CAN frames,
where each row represents a single CAN frame and each column represents a data feature.
The author considers a 13 × 13 CAN image as the author has 13 data features in our
dataset (Khan et al. 2020). The constructed CAN image dataset is represented by 𝐷 =
{(𝑥𝑖 , 𝑦𝑖 )}𝑁
𝑖=1 , where 𝑥𝑖 is a 13 × 13 CAN image, with a label 𝑦𝑖 ∈ {0,1} representing no
attack and attack image. 𝑁 is the number of total samples in 𝐷. The author divides the total
samples of, 𝑁=6000 into 80% training dataset (i.e., 4800 samples) and 20% testing dataset
(i.e.,1200 samples).
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Feature extraction using classical neural network
As presented in (Song, Woo, and Kim 2020), the author also uses a CNN for
extracting the features from a 13 × 13 CAN image and produce a 4 × 4 reduced image.
The feature extraction from CNN can be represented as follows:
𝐿4𝑥4 = 𝐿𝑛−1 ○ 𝐿𝑛−2 ○ 𝐿𝑛−3 … . 𝐿𝑛1 ○ 𝐿𝑛0
𝐿𝑖 : 𝑥𝑖−1 → 𝑥𝑖 = 𝜑(𝑊𝑖 𝑥𝑖−1 + 𝑏𝑖 )
Where, 𝐿4𝑥4 is the output of a CNN, 𝐿𝑖 is the 𝑖 𝑡ℎ layer of the CNN; 𝑥𝑖−1 and 𝑥𝑖 are the
input and output vectors of 𝐿𝑖 ; 𝑊𝑖 is the weight, 𝑏𝑖 is a bias vector and 𝜑 is a nonlinear
function. Hyperparameters, such as number of layers(𝑛), 𝑊𝑖 and 𝑏𝑖 are optimized during
the training phase on the training dataset for accurate classification.
Quantum encoding
To perform quantum operations (e.g., unitary operations, such as rotation, and
phase flip of qubits) on each 𝐿4𝑥4 image, the author needs to convert the classical data into
quantum data. The author performs quantum basis encoding as follows:
|𝜑〉 =

1

𝑁

∑|𝑏𝑖 〉
√𝑁 𝑖=1

Where, |𝜑〉 is an encoded quantum basis, where the basis |0〉 represents normal data and
|+1〉 represents attack data, 𝑏𝑖 is a binary value for each data point of a 𝐿4𝑥4 image produced
using binary thresholding with a value of 0.5. Figure 3. 3 shows the output after the data is
encoded into quantum binary image data.
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Figure 3. 3 Quantum encoded binary data.
Classification using quantum neural network
With quantum encoded data, the author trains the parameterized quantum NN
(Broughton et al. 2020). The parameterized quantum NN performs unitary operations, such
as rotation, phase flip, on qubits and can be represented as follows:
𝑄 = 𝑄𝑑−1 ○ 𝑄𝑑−2 … 𝑄1 ○ 𝑄0
𝑄𝑖 : |𝜑〉 → 𝑦 = 𝑈(𝑤)|𝜑〉
Where 𝑄 is a binary output with {0,1}, where 0 and 1 represent no attack and attack
detected, respectively; 𝑄 has 𝑑 number of layers, 𝑈(𝑤) is a unitary operation on |𝜑〉 with
a weight 𝑤, and 𝑦 is the output after performing the unitary operation 𝑈(𝑤).

Experimental Results
The author compares the performance of the hybrid quantum-classical NN (Figure
3. 2) with the or classical NN alone (Figure 3. 4) and quantum NN alone (Figure 3. 5). For
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a fair comparison, the author selected the equivalent hyperparameters for each type of NN
(Table 3. 1).

Figure 3. 4 Compareable classical neural network.

Figure 3. 5 Compareable quantum only neural network
Figure 3. 6 shows the attack detection accuracy on the training dataset and testing
dataset. For both the training and testing dataset the hybrid quantum-classical NN shows
93% and 90% accuracy, respectively, whereas the quantum-only NN (Farhi and Neven
2018) shows 84%, and 62% accuracy on the training dataset and testing dataset,
respectively. With the classical NN (Song, Woo, and Kim 2020), the attack detection
accuracy is 59% and 61% on the training and testing dataset, respectively. Here, the
classical NN-based feature extractor was able to extract the features and the quantum NN
was able to perform more accurate attack detection. The feature map extracted from the
classical NNs, CNN in this case, allowed the parameterized quantum NN to explore the
neighboring features in an exponentially large linear space, potentially allowing our
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hybrid-classical NN to capture the patterns in the dataset (i.e., statistical distributions) more
efficiently than classical NN alone and quantum NN alone.
Table 3. 1 Hyperparameter for different neural networks
Hybrid QuantumQuantumHyperparameters
Classical NN
only NN

Classical
NN

6

6

N/A

Number of epochs

20

20

20

Number of layers

3

3

5

Batch size

32

32

32

Total trainable parameters

24

24

24

cyberattac detection accyracy (%)

Number of qubits

100
80
60

40
20
0

Hybrid QuantumClassical NN

Quantum-only NN

Training dataset

Classical NN

Testing dataset

Figure 3. 6 Cyberattack detection accuracy for different neural networks.
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Chapter Conclusions
In a cloud-supported IoT environment, a hybrid-classical neural network performs
better in detecting an in-vehicle cyberattack compared to a quantum neural network, and a
classical neural network, as a hybrid-quantum neural network, can capture the complex
pattern of a cyberattack more efficiently.
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